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The Demise of Universality: 
Federal Financing for Post-Secondary Education in Canada1 
 
Paul Weaver, Simon Fraser University 
Department of Political Science, M.A. Candidate 
 
 
This paper has two central objectives. Generally, its purpose is to trace the trajectory of 
the fiscal relationships that exist between Canada’s two orders of government.  In 
particular, the main focus is on the linkages financing post-secondary education.  
Towards that end, the paper is structured on a broad canvas in the following manner.  
First, the concept of federalism is examined, which establishes the theoretical context 
underpinning the intergovernmental relationships in Canada.  Next, the different types of 
transfers between the federal and provincial government that finance post-secondary 
education are investigated arguing that the imprecision of these arrangements obscures 
lines of accountability for post-secondary education as outlined in the constitution.  And 
third, the implications of these arrangements for the provision of educational services are 
traced in order to suggest that recent developments in the funding regimes are the product 
of changing federal policy preferences that favour economic efficiency over social 
cohesion.  Overall then, this paper suggests that although post-secondary education is an 
area of provincial jurisdiction, the fiscal arrangements that finance this area of social 
policy have altered the nature of its delivery.  As such, recent changes to the funding 
                                                          
1 A portion of the title is borrowed from an article by Dr. Stephen Phillips, “The Demise of Universality: 
The Politics of Income Security in Canada, 1978-1993.” A paper submitted to the Annual Meeting of the 
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regimes represent a shift in policy orientation from one previously based on a pan-
Canadian universality to a policy more oriented towards individuals and their ability to 
pay.  
 
Federalism, the Division of Powers and Post-Secondary of 
Education - Who’s Responsible for What? 
 
Within the rubric of political discourse, numerous taxonomies have been proposed to 
conceptualize an authoritative definition of a federal system.  K.C. Wheare for instance, offers the 
classical definition of federalism as a system of governmental organization, which assigns 
constitutional responsibilities to two different orders of government—central and regional.  
According to Wheare, the divided powers are such that each is sovereign in its own area of 
constitutional competence, with neither being subordinate to the other.2  Similarly, Whittington 
and Van Loon argue that federalism contends with intergovernmental sovereignty.  For them, 
sovereignty is also divided among two orders of government, establishing legislative powers 
limited to those areas allotted to them in the constitution.3  Taken together, these explanations 
sketch the complexity regarding federal systems of governance.4  For this inquiry, the concept of 
federalism and the division of local and national policy responsibilities offered above is suggested 
as an analytic device in which to assess the legislative powers in Canada, and in particular, those 
responsible for post-secondary education.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
British Columbia Political Studies Association, The University of Victoria, Victoria BC, May 5-6 2000: 1-
28. 
2 K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963): 10.  
3 Michael Whittington and Richard J. Van Loon, Canadian Government and Politics: Institutions and 
Processes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996): 130. 
4 Harvey Lazar lists four reasons why Canada is one of the most decentralized, non-interdependent and 
non-hierarchically organized federations in the world; (1) the constitution lists only three concurrent 
powers; (2) both orders of government have taxation powers: (3) some elements of the central governments 
power have fallen into disuse [e.g. reservation and disallowance]; and (4) comparatively, there are few 
conditions on the fiscal transfers to the sub-levels of government. In Harvey Lazar, “The Social Union 
Framework Agreement and the Future of Fiscal Federalism,” Canada: The State of the Federation 
(1999/2000): Toward a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal Federalism. Ed. Harvey Lazar. 
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Enumerating powers between two orders of government in Canada was, among 
other things, conceived as a way to manage political discord between the French and 
English in British North America.5  Initially, this bi-cultural compromise safeguarded 
distinct cleavages in the new Dominion.  However, Monahan notes that the allocation of 
legislative responsibility “did not establish Canada as a true federal union.”6  In fact, 
several aspects of the Constitution Act, 1867 indicate the constitutional framers intended 
the central government to occupy a superior status,7 which has given rise to lasting 
challenges between the two orders of government.8 
The division of legislative powers between the two orders of government is 
detailed in Sections 91 through 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.9  Section 91 
enumerates the federal powers, and consists of two parts.  Part one describes a general 
grant of power to the federal parliament, known as the “Peace, Order and Good 
Government” clause, while Part two lists twenty-nine exclusive federal policy areas.10  
Section 92 assigned sole responsibility for sixteen policy matters to the provincial 
governments.11  Section 93 allocates responsibility for education12 to the provinces, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1999: 99-128. Available online at: 
<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/lazar_chapter.pdf>: 13-14.  
5 See Edwin Black’s five different conceptions of Canadian federalism in Patrick J. Smith’s Law, Politics 
and the Administration of Justice: Canadian Cases, Comparative Perspectives, Vancouver: Pacific Policy 
Press, 1997: 57-65.  
6 Patrick J. Monahan, Constitutional Law, Concord ONT: Irwin Law, 1997: 97.  
7 For instance, the residual Disallowance, Reservation and Declaratory powers endowed the Federal 
government with the authority to virtually nullify provincial legislation. See Rand Dyck, Canadian 
Politics: Critical Approaches, 2nd ed. Scarborough: Thompson, 1996: 69-77.     
8 This paragraph has been paraphrased from Paul Weaver, Fiscal Federalism and Social Policy in Canada: 
The Financing of Structural Adjustment, Term Paper for POL 324, 1 March, 2002: 4, 5.    
9 Three special provisions of the Constitution Act – sections 109 (where the provinces were given full title 
to “All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties” within their boundaries), 121 (describing unfettered trade of 
“All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture” between the provinces), and 132 (the federal Treaty 
power) – was allocated to the federal government and hence, could also be argued to be federal. 
10 For example, ss.91 (1); “The Regulation of Trade and Commerce, ss. 91(3); The raising of Money by any 
Mode or System of Taxation and ss.91 and ss (4); The borrowing of Money on the Public credit.  
11 For example, ss.92 (2) “Direct taxation,” ss.92, (3) “The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the 
Province,” and ss. 92 (7) “The establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals.” 
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subject to four provisions.13   Section 95 describes two concurrent powers, agriculture 
and immigration, while sections 96 through 101 relate to the judiciary.14  
As Canada became increasingly industrialized, debates emerged regarding the 
utility of higher education and whether its provision should be an individual or 
government responsibility.  For example, some have argued that post-secondary 
education enables individuals to access greater social and economic opportunities;15 that 
is, whether higher education is a vehicle for social and economic advancement. 
According those who subscribe to this view, the provision of post-secondary education is 
a societal responsibility and as such, ought to be administered by government.  Others16 
however, assert that higher education should be an individual, not societal responsibility, 
arguing that it is the individual themselves that receives the most benefits from a post-
secondary education.  In this instance, the federal government realized that a university 
education underpins social and economic development, representing a long-term societal 
investment.17  Acting on this recognition, after the turn of the twentieth century Ottawa 
embarked on several initiatives to ensure increased access to this resource.18  
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 At Confederation, this meant responsibility for religious or denominational schools. 
13 Here, Whittington and Van Loon argue that section 93 established limitations on the exercise of this 
power by the provinces. According to them, the limitations translate into education being a concurrent – 
shared – policy area between the two levels of government, endowing the federal government with the 
power to “police” and “protect” the rights of religious minorities. Whittington and Van Loon, 198.   
14 Weaver, 5.  
15 Terry Witherspoon, “The Dynamics of Social Inclusion and Exclusion in Public Education,” The 
Canadian Council on Social Development, available at: [www.ccsd.caq/subsites/inclusion/bp/tw.htm], n.d.  
16 Page 53 of Andrew J. Coulson, “Market Education and the Public Good,” Can the Market Save our  
Schools? Claudia R. Hepburn ed. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2001: 53-72. Available online at: 
<http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/publications/books/market_schools/5_coulson.pdf>, 2001. 
17 Benjamin Levin and Nancy Sullivan, Governments and Universities, Vol., XVIII - 1 (1988): 1, 2. 
18 Derek Hum and Frank Strain, “Fiscal Transfers, Horizontal Equity and Post Secondary Education,” The 
Canadian Journal of Higher Education. XVIII (2): 1988, document several federal laws that targeted 
specific policy sectors and demographic groups (the 1913 Agricultural Instruction Act, the 1919 Technical 
Education Act, the 1937 Unemployment and Agricultural Assistance Act and the Youth Training Act in 
1939) that arose out of the 1910 Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Vocational Education with 
the objective of stimulating economic growth; 18,19.   
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Fiscal Federalism and The Financing of Higher Education  
Many of the powers listed in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 granted the federal 
government extensive levers over the economy and other areas of national concern.  In 
addition, the constitution also endowed the provinces with the legislative and regulatory 
responsibility for matters of local importance.  At times, this division of responsibility 
has led to competition between federal and provincial policy domains.  In many 
instances, taxation, the means to raise revenue for policy expenditures to finance social 
policy areas such as post-secondary education for example, has been especially 
problematic.  Under the original Constitution, the provinces were limited to direct 
taxation powers only  – listed in section 91 (2) and (3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 – 
which impinged on their capacity to raise revenue.  In contrast, the federal government 
suffered no such limitations.  It was able to ‘raise money by any mode of taxation.’  This 
broad fiscal capacity gave Ottawa virtually unfettered power to raise revenues, levy 
indirect taxes and to exert sweeping influence over provincial policy expenditures like 
post-secondary education.  Brown for instance, argues that the scope of Ottawa’s taxation 
and spending powers, gave the federal government “a right to spend in any field” it saw 
fit.19   Over the course of Canada’s federal maturity, this perceived right has necessitated 
                                                          
19 Douglas Brown, “Fiscal Federalism: The New Equilibrium Between Equity and Efficiency,” Canadian 
Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy, Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstead eds. Don 
Mills: Oxford, 2002: 60. The Spending Power: although the constitution endowed both levels of 
government with taxation powers, the federal government enjoyed greater revenue raising capacity, due to 
its ability to tax directly, while the provinces were only allowed to tax indirectly – this asymmetrical 
taxation regime, lead to a series of “checkerboard” taxation systems between different provinces. The 
taxation agreements during the war harmonized the tax system; however, the provinces were still left with 
an insufficient level of revenue to deliver the social services of an emerging welfare state.    
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a series of complex arrangements in which the two levels of government have combined 
forces to coordinate and finance post-secondary education.20  
Prior to World War Two, post-secondary education was not considered an 
especially noteworthy area of provincial jurisdiction.  In fact, Hum and Strain report that 
most post-secondary institutions relied on tuition fees and private donations to finance 
their operations,21 rather than any kind of government subsidy.  This commonly meant 
institutions of higher learning were the exclusive domain of wealthy elite’s who could 
afford to pay the tuition fees in order to attend.  
After World War Two, the federal government initiated its first level of 
involvement in post-secondary education.  As part of the post-war Keynesian consensus, 
the federal government initiated numerous spending endeavors in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction to support post-secondary institutions.22 In 1945 for example, the Veterans 
Rehabilitation Act established a grant program for Canadian soldiers returning from the 
war.  These grants enabled veterans to attend Canadian post-secondary education 
institutions with little or not out of pocket cost;23 however, despite the positive aspects of 
this initiative, some side effects for the division of powers also occurred.  For instance, 
many institutions of higher learning across the country experienced increased levels of 
enrollment and revenues during this time, which was chiefly due to the grants to the 
returning Veterans, which signified the beginning of a federal stamp on that provincial 
                                                          
20 Brown, 64-65; Paul Barker, “Disentangling the Federation: Social Policy and Fiscal Federalism,” 
Challenges to Canadian Federalism, Martin Westmacott and Hugh Mellon eds. Scarborough Ont: Prentice 
1998: 144.  
21Hum and Strain, 22.  
22 Harvey Lazar, “In Search of A New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal Federalism,” Canada: The 
State of the Federation (1999/2000): Toward a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal Federalism,  
Harvey Lazar ed. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1999: 8-10. Available online at: 
<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/lazar_mission_statement.pdf>.  
23 Hum and Strain, 22.  
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policy area.24  As the twentieth century progressed, the nature of the federal 
government’s involvement would become increasingly explicit.  For the most part, this 
resulted as Ottawa began to use the power of its purse to shape the nature of provincial 
funds directed toward post-secondary education.   
 
A Paradigm Shift; or two, or three… 
In the decades that followed the Second World War, the fiscal relationships between 
institutions of higher learning and both levels of government underwent many changes.  
Three phases of intergovernmental funding emerged during this time.  First, from the 
1950s to late 1960s, the federal government adopted a nation building strategy of pan-
Canadian initiatives to help facilitate the post-war economic expansion.  This relationship 
was characterized by a brief period of direct block grants to individual institutions that 
not only augmented their individual operating costs but also supplied the labour market 
with a steady supply of skilled graduates.  Second, from the 1960s until the early 1990s, a 
series of cooperative, intergovernmental arrangements sustained a criterion of national 
standards for access to post-secondary institutions within the different provinces 
developed.  And last, acute fiscal and economic exigencies created by public concern 
over a rising deficit and continental integration in the early 1990’s necessitated a hasty 
federal withdrawal from many shared policy areas including post-secondary education.  
Acting on the 1951 Royal Commission on National Development for the Arts, 
Letters and Science, the federal government established per-capita funding transfers 
known as block grants to fund institutions of higher education.25  The grants transferred 
funding directly to the institutions themselves, rather than to individuals as with the 
                                                          
24 Ibid.  
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Veterans Act funding.  This funding shift reinforced the federal toehold in that area of 
provincial jurisdiction.  
In the 1960’s, another per-capita grant system emerged to further alter the 
intergovernmental arrangements funding post-secondary education.  Due to the nature of 
the per capital funding, increased enrolments and limited revenues at this time, 
institutions in different provinces began to offer irregular levels of access and quality of 
service.  Provinces like Nova Scotia for instance, with small populations and tax bases 
experienced difficulty providing adequate levels of access to their residents as demand 
for entry into post-secondary institutions increased.  Alternatively, Ontario, which 
received larger grants because of their larger population, suffered no such difficulties.  In 
essence, the per-capita transfers established an asymmetrical system of policy 
development, whereby the larger provinces with more institutions, received more funding 
and were thus able to provide higher quality services than the smaller, less populated 
provinces.  In sum, a “patchwork” of policies developed.  
The per-capita grants from the federal government to post-secondary institutions 
ended in the late 1960s.  In their place, the federal government began to transfer post-
secondary education funding directly to the provincial governments.  And in turn, the 
provinces issued individual operating grants to the institutions in 1967.26  This shift in 
funding translated into the provinces receiving an unconditional block transfer from the 
federal government consisting of cash and tax points, which represented fifty percent of 
the operating grants of the post-secondary institutions.  According to Barker, these grants 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 Barker, 146.  
26 Hum and Strain, 23.  
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were issued with the expectation that the provinces would pay for the remaining 50%,27 
this arrangement was known as a cost-sharing or 50/50 funding arrangement.  The 50/50 
spending formula established a system of financing higher education where the provincial 
government was expected to pay 50% of the operating costs of the post-secondary 
institutions and the federal government 50%, without any of the other “conditions” 
placed on social initiatives such as social welfare or health care; 28 however, despite the 
increasing scope of federal involvement in this area, it did not have the constitutional 
authority to regulate the institutions specifically or policy domain in general—this 
responsibility continued to fall to the provinces.29 
Despite the increased flow of revenues that accompanied the new funding regime, 
the design of the agreements was flawed.  For example, because the 50/50 funding 
formula was a federal initiative that intersected an exclusive area of provincial 
jurisdiction, Hancock30 and Barker argue the arrangements became a flashpoint for 
intergovernmental tension.  For some observers of this funding mechanism, the 50/50 
formula was a pliable funding device that not only ensured each province had a secure 
source of funding for higher learning but also gave them enough flexibility to decide 
where the funding would go. Paul Barker for example, argues that the pan-Canadian 
agreements were established with the consent of the provinces and in doing so, increased 
funding levels ensured reasonable levels of access to post-secondary institutions.31  
Others, however, have argued the 50/50 financing arrangement was simply a way for the 
                                                          
27 Barker, 147.  
28 Dyck, 77. In addition, on pages 19 and 20, Hum and Strain catalogue the origin of the cost-sharing 
agreements, asserting they emerged from the 1927 Old Age Pension Plan in which the federal government 
reimbursed the provinces “$0.50 cents for every $1.00 spent on old age pensions: the so-called 50/50 
formula.”  
29 Weaver, 8. 
30 Dave Hancock, “Designing a New Social Framework for Canadians,” Policy Options (Nov 1998): 17-20. 
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federal government to invade areas of provincial jurisdiction.  In this instance, Baier 
argues the fiscal transfers to the provinces allowed “the federal government to infiltrate 
areas of provincial jurisdiction,”32 and triggered partisan conflicts between Ottawa and 
the provinces.  In particular, many of these tensions developed between the two levels of 
government regarding the connection between the federal government’s spending in areas 
outside of its jurisdiction and the constitutional responsibility for an emerging social 
union.33  
In addition to the intergovernmental tension, the new funding arrangements to the 
provinces also established some unintended consequences. For instance, vertical fiscal 
imbalances between institutions in different provinces started to emerge. These 
imbalances occurred in two different ways: first in terms of access to post-secondary 
institutions and second, quality of educational services provided.  In the first instance, 
since the original federal funding was calculated on a per-capita basis and transferred 
revenue directly to the institutions, provinces with larger populations and more 
institutions received higher levels of federal funding and were therefore endowed with 
the capacity to delivery better services.  And in the second case, because the transfer of 
funds and tax points were of a block variety, the new changes did not provide the 
provincial governments any inducements to sustain adequate levels of service delivery. 
Consequently, when demand increased, the provinces began to struggle to deliver in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 Barker, 147. 
32 Gerald Baier, “Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism,” in Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy, Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstead eds. Don Mills: Oxford, 2002: 30. 
33 A term that describes the network of shared federal/provincial social programs (e.g. health care, post-
secondary education, pensions and welfare) that provides Canadians with equitable levels of access to an 
array of services that enhance their quality of life. Anne McLellan “Modernizing Canada’s Social Union: A 
New Partnership Among Governments and Citizens,” Policy Options (Nov 1998): 8; page 1172 in 
Kumanan Wilson’s “Health care, federalism and the new Social Union,” Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 162 (8) 18 April 2000: 1171-1175. 
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very policy area allocated to them under the constitution.34  Similarly, when the 
provinces’ funding for other areas of social policy fell short, they began to draw on the 
block grants to make up for the shortfall, which diverted finances away from the post-
secondary institutions,35 buttressing imbalances in program access.   
Starting in the late 1970s, the federal government shifted the federal funding for 
post-secondary education yet again.  By this time, over half of all government spending 
in areas of social assistance, post-secondary education and health was financed by the 
federal government.36 At this point, spending on social programs came under intense 
scrutiny.  Due to an increased awareness of the deficit, the federal government instituted 
two changes altering the financing and coordination of post-secondary education in 
Canada.  The first change came in the late 1970s as Ottawa restructured funding 
arrangements to fight the growing deficit, while the second change came in the mid-
1990s as huge cuts to the transfer payments that financed provincial social programs such 
as post-secondary education took place.  Both of these changes fundamentally altered the 
policy orientation of higher education and the role of government in its provision. 
In 1977, Ottawa introduced the Established Programs Financing Act (EPF) as an 
adjustment to the existing structure of financing social policy in Canada.37  As a funding 
mechanism, the EPF consolidated three programs – post-secondary education, medical 
insurance and hospital insurance – from individual fiscal transfers into one block fund. 
Under the new arrangement, funding for post-secondary education was transferred to the 
different provincial governments as a combination of cash transfers and tax points 
                                                          
34 Charles Caccia, “Sovereignty in federal states – differing approaches,” Canada – United States Law 
Journal, 24 (1998): 74.  
35 G.C. Ruggeri, “Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Renewed Federalism.” Policy Options  (Nov 1998): 48.  
36 Hancock, 19.  
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transferred in lieu of cash,38 ending the old 50/50, ‘conditional nature’ of past 
expenditures.   Instead, the EPF was designed in such a way that increases to the transfer 
payments to the provinces for the three programs was indexed; that is, linked to annual 
growth in the economy and population.39  In this way, Ottawa was able to establish a 
ceiling for its contribution to provincial post-secondary education expenditures and the 
EPF, rather than link itself to escalating provincial spending preferences.40  
The new funding arrangements yielded a mixed bag of responses from the 
provinces.  For most, the changes were heralded as a victory, translating into greater 
levels of financial flexibility; however, Ottawa capped the growth of the transfer 
payments to the provinces by linking their growth to increases in their gross domestic 
product.41   Wilson suggests these changes lead to a “less hierarchical relationship” with 
the federal government because the block grants reoriented the program-funding system 
to reflect more policy freedom for the provinces,42 which allowed them to concentrate on 
administering their different higher education needs.  Redden on the other hand offers a 
different view.  She argues that the tax point contribution of the EPF was a way for 
Ottawa to offload some of its spending obligations. According to her, the transfer of tax 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 Harvey Lazar, “The Social Union Framework Agreement and the Future of Fiscal Federalism,” 199,120.  
38 The Established Programs Financing arrangement consisted of three, interrelated components. The first 
was a block – unconditional – grant. Next, was a tax transfer consisting of 13.5% of a personal tax transfer 
and 1% of corporate income tax. And finally, the last element of the EPF was an equalization component, 
which sought to equalize provincial disparities in public services. Barker, 147; Candace Redden, Through 
the Looking Glass: Federal and Provincial Decision- Making for Health Policy. Kingston: Institute for 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. Available at: Queens University, Institute for Intergovernmental 
Relations, Working Paper Series, Available online at: 
<www.qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/working_paper_series/Redden.html>, 1999: 9; Rand Dyck, 
Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches  2nd ed, Scarborough: Thompson, 1996: 79; Hum and Strain, 24.  
39 Barker, 147; Hum and Strain, 24.  
40 Dyck, 79.  
41 Weaver, 11.  
42 Kumanan Wilson, “Health care, federalism and the new Social Union,” Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 162 (8) 18 April 2000: 1172. 
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points is not really a federal contribution.  Instead, because of the changes, the provinces 
simply took responsibility for an area of taxation vacated by the federal government.43  
By linking the growth of federal transfer payments to annual growth in the 
provincial economy and population changes in the EPF benefited both Ottawa and the 
provinces.  For Ottawa, the changes established a limit to its spending obligations, while 
also providing an escape clause44 that allowed them to elude an increasingly costly 
financial relationship with the provinces.45  Similarly, the provinces were given the 
much-needed flexibility to design their own programs.  In the end, Ottawa’s spending on 
post-secondary education began to substantially decline because of the funding changes, 
which signaled the beginning of a sea change in activity to shift the increasing burden of 
funding higher education onto the individual provinces. 
The second major change to the funding formulas for post-secondary education 
came with the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in the 1995 
federal budget.  Over the course of the next several years, the new funding mechanism 
was a major blow for areas of provincial social policy, including post-secondary 
education.  The CHST was a block grant46 consisting of three different parts; one, an 
“amalgamation of purpose-specific grants”47 that consolidated post-secondary education, 
                                                          
43 Redden, 9.  
44 Paul A. R. Wilson and France St. Hilaire in The Evolution of Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements: 
Putting Humpty Together Again, argue that implementing the EPF was a strategic, rather than structural 
decision, designed to sever the cost-sharing links to provincial expenditures in order to induce the 
provinces to eventually assume full responsibility for all social programs. Kingston: Institute for 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. Queens University, Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, Working 
Paper Series, Available at:  
<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/hobson_st_hilaire_chapter.pdf>, 163.  
45 Baier, “Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism,” 30.  
46 Despite being a block grant, the CHST still imposed conditions on the provinces in order to receive 
funding. For example, the provinces agreed not to impose residency requirements on those seeking social 
assistance and must comply with the conditions of the Canada Health Act in order to receive funding for 
provincial health care services.  
47 Brown, 63.  
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social assistance and health care expenditures into one “super block fund;”48 two, 
substantial cuts49 to the amount of funds transferred to the provinces;50 and three, a plan 
to eliminate fiscal disparities between provinces.51  Under the CHST, federal 
contributions towards post-secondary education significantly declined over the next five 
years, falling “behind most other areas of social funding.”52  Among other things, much 
of the cutbacks were due to an ongoing war on the deficit and Canada’s membership and 
participation in an increasingly globalized trade environment.  Together, however, they 
have reoriented the focus of delivery of higher educational services toward policy 
efficiency rather than policy equity.53  
So far, this essay has tried to establish the fiscal linkages between the federal and 
provincial governments in Canada and their relationship to the provision of post-
secondary education.  It has been argued that the federal government has used its superior 
fiscal position to impose national standards in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, 
namely that of post-secondary education.  Despite the simplicity in which these 
arrangements have been presented, these intergovernmental relationships that finance and 
                                                          
48 Allan M. Maslove, “The Canadian Health and Social Transfer: Forcing Issues,” How Ottawa Spends 
1996-1997: Life Under the Knife, Gene Swimmer (ed) Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996: 284.  
49 Lindquist suggests the amount cut from the transfer payments to the provinces was approximately $7.9 
billion over five years, 45. Over this same period, the Canadian Association of Teachers claim the amount 
directed towards post-secondary education in particular, was approximately one billion dollars; in “The 
Funding Gap: Government Expenditures on post-secondary education, 1999- 00.” The Canadian 
Association of University Teachers Education Review. Vol. 3 (3) 2000: 6.  Available online at: 
<www.caut.ca/english/publications/review/education%20review2-3.pdf>, 2001. 
50 Weaver, 12.  
51 Government of Canada, Department of Finance and Department of Supply and Services, Budget Speech, 
1996, “A Focused More Affordable Government.” Available at: 
<http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget96/speeche/speech2e.htm >, 1996.  
52 Ron Melchers, “University Finance in Canada: 1972 to the Present,” Missing Pieces II: An Alternative 
Guide to Canadian Post-Secondary Education, Denise Doherty-Delorme and Erika Shaker eds., Ottawa: 
Canadian Center for policy Alternatives, 2001: 109.  
53 For more on the reasons why the federal government cutback the amount of public funding towards 
higher education, see Missing Pieces II: An Alternative Guide to Canadian Post-Secondary Education, 
Denise Doherty-Delorme and Erika Shaker eds., Ottawa: Canadian Center for policy Alternatives, 2001.  
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coordinate post-secondary education in Canada are very complex54 and as such, are 
difficult to decipher; however, the aftermath that followed these policy shifts are quite 
simple.  The following section examines the implications of the austerity measures 
Ottawa adopted toward post-secondary education.  
 
“The Demise of Universality” 55 
The changes to the level of federal funding for post-secondary education mentioned 
above have also affected post-secondary institutions and students.56   Kitchen57 and 
others58 for instance, argue that as federal funding began to dwindle and provincial 
governments decreased their funding to institutions, tuition fees have begun to increase.59  
Each province was affected differently however.  In fact, by 1998 a patchwork of fee 
levels emerged across the country.  In New Brunswick for example, fees for full time 
undergraduates ranged from $500 for a full course load at Mount Allison in Sackville, all 
the way up to $7500 in Alberta at the University of Lethbridge for a similar workload.60  
                                                          
54 Weaver, 13.  
55 This sub-title is partially borrowed from a paper written by Dr. Stephen Phillips. See title page.  
56 For one, the Canadian Federation of Students, the largest student advocacy group in Canada, has argued 
that the funding cutbacks have seriously hurt education while also driving levels of student debt to new 
heights. For example, in 1993, the average level of debt for a student graduating with a four year degree 
from a Canadian university, was $9000.  Today, that amount is approximately $25, 000, or almost three 
time the amount less than ten years ago. For more see, < http://www.cfs.bc.ca/>, 2002.  
57 Harry Kitchen, Provinces and Municipalities, Universities, Schools and Hospitals: Recent Trends and 
Funding Issues, Kingston Ont: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 313-317. Accessed through 
Queens University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, The Future of Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Relations. Available at: 
<http://www.qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/kitchen_chapter.pdf>, 2002.  
58 The Government of British Columbia, The Ministry of Advanced Education and Training, “Post-
Secondary Funding, Federal Spending on Post-Secondary Education: Transfers to Provinces: Trends and 
Consequences. Available at: <http://www.aved.gov.bc.ca/policy/>, 1999.  
59 Melville L. McMillan and Debasish Datta, “The Relative Inefficiencies of Canadian Universities: A DEA 
Perspective,” Canadian Public Policy, XXIV vol., 4 (1998): 486. Also available online at: 
<http://www.econ.queensu.ca/pub/cpp/Dec1998/Datta.pdf>, 1998. In fact, according to the Canadian 
Federation of Students, the average increase of fees over the last ten years has been approximately 126%, 
or 8 times the rate of inflation. The Canadian Federation of Students, “National Post-Secondary Issues,” 
available at: <http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/new_campaigns/#funding>, 2002.   
60 CFSfact #191. Available at: <www.cfs-fcee.ca/ngc/index.shtml>.  
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Ontario however, has experienced the lion’s share of fee hikes.  According to Charlton, 
the average undergraduate fees have risen 60% from 1995 to 2000 and many graduate 
programs have been deregulated.61  In British Columbia however, undergraduate fees 
have been frozen since 1995.  On the whole, as the changes begin to take effect, the 
number of full-time post-secondary students enrolled in bachelor programs has begun to 
decline, especially after 1992.62  Simply stated, many of these changes have put an 
increased burden on provincial governments to provide sufficient funding to institutions 
and students alike as a way to compensate for the funding shortfalls.  
 
Where do we go from here? Concluding Comments 
This essay has examined the fiscal arrangements between Canada’s two orders of 
government.  In particular, it has emphasized their relationship to the provision of post-
secondary education in Canada.   From the nature of the discussion to this point, it is 
clear that over the course of the twentieth century, the federal government has entered 
into and subsequently reduced its level of involvement in this area.  This is apparent 
simply from observing the decline to their financial commitments directed towards higher 
education.  In this instance, the provinces have been forced to make up for much of the 
funding shortfalls due to their constitutional responsibilities.  This occurrence has had 
lasting public policy ramifications and raises more questions regarding the normative and 
ideological doctrines guiding federal and provincial policymaking.  Foremost among 
                                                          
61 Deregulation of tuition fees refers to the process of removing all provincially imposed limits on tuition 
fee increases, which allows the individual institutions to set fee levels. Chris Charlton, “Ontario,” Missing 
Pieces II: An Alternative Guide to Canadian Post-Secondary Education, Denise Doherty-Delorme and 
Erika Shaker eds., Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 2001: 30.  
62 Brigette Bouchard and John Zhao, “University education: Recent trends in participation, accessibility and 
returns,” Education Quarterly Review, vol., 6 (4) 2000: 25-27. 
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concerns in this area however, is the federal government’s entrance, influence, and 
eventual departure from an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.  
Some would argue that since higher education is a positive externality of a market 
economy that optimizes the overall social welfare, governments have a responsibility to 
supplement that societal need. 63  This seemed to be the case in the years following World 
War Two; however, as Canada has became increasingly reliant on the market to provide 
services to individuals, both levels of government began to shift their policies toward 
post-secondary education to reflect more of an individual or voluntary approach.  In this 
way, the federal government has relinquished its fiduciary obligation to fund higher 
education to the provinces, who have then passed it on to individual institutions.  
Consequently, many are left with the difficult task of trying to meet increasing levels of 
service obligations with limited resources. For some, this may provide a partial 
explanation for the increased tuition fees.  
In sum, changes to the funding of post-secondary education in Canada represent 
shifting policy priorities that have ultimately come full-circle.  It has only been over the 
last three decades that both levels of government have began to reduce their financial 
commitments to institutions of higher learning, which suggests that many do not want not 
want the responsibility of providing post-secondary education.  By funding individuals 
and institutions directly, the original objective of post-secondary education was oriented 
towards facilitating the post-war economic expansion, as the federal government supplied 
the economy with a steady source of skilled labour.  As the economy expanded and levels 
of direct government funding began to decline however, market based instruments have 
                                                          
63 Howlett, 28.  
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crept into the public domain, which indicates that government policy towards higher 
education is changing to reflect the increasing importance of economic principles in the 
provision of public policy.  In this instance, both the federal and provincial levels of 
government have begun to shift the provision of public services like post-secondary 
education to the market and funding back onto individuals.  If the recent trend of funding 
cuts and rising tuition fees continue, higher education may once again become an 
exclusive policy domain for the wealthy who will be the only ones able to afford the fees 
in order to attend.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weaver, The Demise of Universality 
 19
 
 
References 
 
Barker, Paul. “Disentangling the Federation: Social Policy and Fiscal Federalism.”  
Challenges to Canadian Federalism. Martin Westmacott and Hugh Mellon. eds. 
Scarborough Ont: Prentice 1998: 144-157. 
 
Bouchard, Brigette and John Zhao. “University education: Recent trends in participation,  
accessibility and returns.” Education Quarterly Review. Vol. 6 (4) 2000: 24-32. 
 
Brown, Douglas M. “Fiscal Federalism: The New Equilibrium Between Equity and  
Efficiency.” Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy.  
Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstead eds. Don Mills: Oxford, 2002. 
 
Canadian Association of University Teachers. Paul Martin and the Per Cent Solution.  
Available online at: <http://www.caut.ca/english/bulletin/96_oct/epf.htm>, 1996.  
 
-----. “The Funding Gap: Government Expenditures on post-secondary education, 1999-00.”  
The Canadian Association of University Teachers Education Review. Vol. 3 (3) 
2000: 1-10. Available online at: 
<www.caut.ca/english/publications/review/education%20review2-3.pdf>, 2001.  
 
Canadian Council on Social Development. “Thinking Ahead: Trends Affecting Public   
Education in the Future, Part II.” <http://www.ccsd.ca/pubs/gordon/part2.htm>, 
 2001.  
 
Canadian Federation of Students, The. “National Post-Secondary Issues.” Available at:  
<http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/new_campaigns/#funding>, 2002. 
 
-----. “CFSfact #191.” Available at: <http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/ngs/index.shtml>, 1998.  
 
Charlton, Chris. “Ontario.” Missing Pieces II: An Alternative Guide to Canadian Post- 
Secondary Education. Denise Doherty-Delorme and Erika Shaker eds. Ottawa: 
Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 2001: 30-33.  
 
Coulson, Andrew J. “Market Education and the Public Good.” Can the Market Save our  
Schools? Claudia R. Hepburn ed. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2001: 53-72. 
Available online at: 
<http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/publications/books/market_schools/5_coulson.pdf>, 
2001.  
 
Dickson, Vaughan, William J. Milne and David Murrell. “Who Should Pay for University  
Education? Some Net Benefit Results by Funding Source for New Brunswick.” 
Canadian Public Policy. Vol., XXII (4) 1996: 315-329.  
   
Dyck, Rand. Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches. 2nd ed. Scarborough: Thompson,  
1996. 
Weaver, The Demise of Universality 
 20
 
 
 
Gagnon, Alain G. “The Political Uses of Federalism.” New Trends in Canadian Federalism.  
Francois Rocher and Miriam Smith. Eds. Peterborough Ont: Broadview, 1995: 23-45. 
 
Government of British Columbia. The Ministry of Advanced Education and Training. “Post- 
Secondary Funding.” Federal Spending on Post-Secondary Education: Transfers to 
Provinces: Trends and Consequences. Available at: 
<http://www.aved.gov.bc.ca/policy/>,1999. 
 
Government of Canada. Human Resources Development Canada, Industry Canada and  
Council of Ministers of Education Canada. A Report on Public Expectations of 
Postsecondary Education in Canada. Council of Ministers of Education, Canada. 
Toronto: 1999.  
 
Government of Canada. b.  Department of Finance and Department of Supply and Services.  
Budget Speech, 1996, “A Focused More Affordable Government.” Available at: 
<http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget96/speeche/speech2e.htm>, 1996. 
 
Hobson, Paul A. R. and France St. Hilaire. The Evolution of Federal-Provincial Fiscal  
Arrangements: Putting Humpty Together Again. Kingston: Institute for 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. Queens University, Institute for 
Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper Series. Available at:  
<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/hobson_st_hilaire_ch
apter.pdf>, 159-188.  
 
Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy  
Subsystems. Don Mills ONT: Oxford, 1995.  
 
Hum, Derek and Frank Strain. “Fiscal Transfers, Horizontal Equity and Post-Secondary  
Education. The Canadian Journal of Higher Education. XVIII (2): 1988, 14-37.  
 
Kitchen, Harry. Provinces and Municipalities, Universities, Schools and Hospitals: Recent  
Trends and Funding Issues. Kingston Ont: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 
n.d. Accessed through Queens University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 
The Future of Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations 
<http://www.qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/kitchen_chapter.pdf> 
2002.  
 
Lazar, Harvey. “In Search of a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal Federalism.”  
Canada: The State of the Federation (1999/2000): Toward a New Mission Statement 
for Canadian Fiscal Federalism. Harvey Lazar. Ed. Kingston Ont: Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1999: 3-39. Available online at: 
<http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/lazar_mission_statem
ent.pdf>. 
 
Levin, Benjamin and Nancy Sullivan. “Governments and Universities.” The Canadian  
Journal of Higher Education. Vol. XVIII (1): 1998, 1-5.  
Weaver, The Demise of Universality 
 21
 
 
 
Maslove, Allan M. “The Canadian Health and Social Transfer: Forcing Issues.” How Ottawa  
Spends 1996-1997: Life Under the Knife. Gene Swimmer (ed) Ottawa: Carleton 
University Press, 1996: 283-301. 
 
McMillan, Melville L and Debasish Datta. “The Relative Inefficiencies of Canadian  
Universities: A DEA Perspective.” Canadian Public Policy, XXIV vol., 4 (1998): 
485-511. Also available online at: 
<http://www.econ.queensu.ca/pub/cpp/Dec1998/Datta.pdf>, 1998.   
  
Melchers, Ron. “University Finance in Canada: 1972 to the Present.” Missing Pieces II: An  
Alternative Guide to Canadian Post-Secondary Education. Denise Doherty-
Delorme and Erika Shaker eds. Ottawa: Canadian Center for policy Alternatives, 
2001: 109-117.   
 
Redden, Candace. Through the Looking Glass: Federal and Provincial Decision-Making  
for Health Policy. Kingston: Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. 
Available at: Queens University, Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, Working 
Paper Series. 
<www.qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/working_paper_series/Redden.html>. 
1999.  
 
Ruggeri, G.C. “Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Renewed Federalism.” Policy Options (Nov  
1998): 47-49. 
 
Sibley, W.M. “The University in the 1990’s: Crisis or Predicament?” The Canadian Journal  
of Higher Education. Vol. XXIII (1): 1993, 114-131.  
 
Tapscott, Don. “Rethinking the University.” Policy Options (July-August 1998): 67-71.  
 
Telford, Hamish. The Federal Spending Power in Canada: Nation-Building or Nation- 
Destroying? Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. Accessed 
through Queens University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Working 
Paper Series. <http://www.qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/>, 2002. 
 
Weaver, Paul. Fiscal Federalism and Social Policy in Canada: The Financing of  
Structural Adjustment. Term Paper for POL 324, SFU: 2002. 
 
Wotherspoon, Terry. “The Dynamics of Social Inclusion and Exclusion in Public   
Education in Canada.” Canadian Council for Social Development. 
<http://www.ccsd.ca/subsites/inclusion/bp/tw.htm>, 2001.  
 
Whittington, Michael and Richard J. Van Loon. Canadian Government and Politics:  
Institutions and Processes. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996. 
 
Whereare, K.C. Federal Government. 4th Ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
